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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURY SUFFERED DURING COFFEE BREAK AS
Aru:SING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT-Plaintiff was employed
by defendant laundry company as a mangle operator. A collective bargain-
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ing agreement between the defendant and the union representing its employees provided for two paid ten minute rest periods during the work day.
Plaintiff left the defendant's premises during such a rest period and went
to a nearby restaurant. On her return she slipped on ice on defendant's
front step and was injured." The Department of Labor and Industry found
the injury compensable under the Michigan Workmen's Compensation
Act.1 On appeal, held, reversed, two justices dissenting. The place of the
injury is not determinative of eligibility for compensation. Because defendant had no control over plaintiff's actions and because plaintiff was
not actively engaged in rendering a service to defendant at the time of the
accident, the injury did not arise out of and in the course of plaintiff's
employment. Salmon v. Bagley Laundry Co., 344 Mich. 471, 74 N.W. (2d)
1 (1955).
The majority of courts have recognized that an employee remains "in
the course of" his employment when he is engaged in ministering to his
personal health, comfort and necessities,2 unless he acts in an independent
and reckless manner or in conflict with specific instructions.3 This rule
is predicated either upon the theory that these are acts that a workman may
reasonably do while employed4 or upon the basis that they are of indirect
benefit to the employer.5 Although these theories are generally extended
to include injuries occurring during rest periods, lunch periods, and coffee
breaks, 6 the majority of the court in the principal case refuses to accept
this application, basing their argument on the fact that the defendant
did not have the right to control the workmen during the rest period because, during that time, they were free to leave his premises.7 The "right
to control" test has often been used to determine whether the employeremployee relationship exists, 8 but not in determining whether the act arises
Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §411.1 et seq.
General Accident &: Liability Ins. Co. v. Brunson, (9th Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d)
906; Haller v. Lansing, 195 Mich. 753, 162 N.W. 335 (1917). See 7 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION, perm. ed., §1617 (1950).
3 Monahan v. Hoage, (D.C. Cir. 1937) 90 F. (2d) 419; Young v. Department of Labor
&: Industries, 200 Wash. 138, 93 P. (2d) 337 (1939); 7 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, perm. ed., §1617 (1950).
4 Haller v. Lansing, note 2 supra.
5 Thomas v. Proctor &: Gamble Mfg. Co., 104 Kan. 432, 179 P. 372 (1919); Mann v.
Board of Education, 266 Mich. 271, 253 N.W. 294 (1934).
6 Sundine's Case, 218 Mass. 1, 105 N.E. 433 (1914); Zurich General Accident &: Liability Ins. Co. v. Brunson, note 2 supra; Kubera's Case, 320 Mass. 419, 69 N.E. (2d) 673
(1946); Sullivan's Estate v. Motor Realty Corp., 272 App. Div. 986, 73 N.Y.S. (2d) 276
(1947); Biagi v. United States, (D.C. Cal. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 697. 7 SCHNEIDER, WoRKMEN's
CoMPENSATION, perm. ed., §1632 (1950); 16 NACCA L. J. 88 (1955).
7 Principal case at 474.
8 The majority cites Tuttle v. Embury-Martin Co., 192 Mich. 385, 158 N.W. 875 (1916);
Dennis v. Sinclair Lumber &: Fuel Co., 242 Mich. 89, 218 N.W. 781 (1928); and Janofski v.
1

2 Zurich
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in the course of the employment. The dissenting opinion of Justice Smith
points out that adoption of such a test is a judicially instigated reversion
to the very common law tests of liability which the workmen's compensation
acts sought to eliminate.9 The effect is to cut the working day into " ...
a checkerboard of legal relationships."10 Such a test loses its usefulness
once it is decided that the employer-employee relationship exists, for it
would exclude many injuries heretofore assumed to be compensable.11
The majority of the court implies that in order for the injury to be compensable an employee must be "actively" engaged in a service to his employer when the injury occurs. While many courts do require a finding
of some benefit to the employer, 12 the rule in the principal case would
apparently require the employee, when injured, to be actually producing
for his employer in order for the injury to arise in the course of his employment. Justice Smith rejects any test of benefit, relying on Haller v.
Lansing,13 and adopting the theory that any act that a workman may reasonably do while employed " ... as part of the on-the-job activities of the
human being involved ..." is in the course of his employment.14 Any test
of benefit smacks of a requirement of consideration passing from employee
to employer. Surely such common law tests should be atiolished when administering an act aimed at compensation, not damages.15 The language
of the dissenting opinion is broad enough to allow recovery wherever the
injury occurs. Perhaps the requirement that an injury must arise "out of"
as well as "in the course of" the employment to be compensable is a sufficient limitation upon such a suggestion.16 Many courts require the finding of " ... a causal connection between the conditions under which the
work is required to be performed and the resulting injury" to substantiate
a finding that the injury arose out of the employment.17 The modern trend
is to allow compensation when the nature, conditions, obligations, or incidents of employment create a zone of special danger out of which the injury
Federal Land Bank, 302 Mich. 124, 4 N.W. (2d) 492 (1942), all of which adopt the "right
to control" test merely to determine whether the injured party was an independent
contractor or an employee.
Principal case at 482-486.
at 485.
11 Theoretically, under the majority's view, an injury suffered by an employee while
getting a drink of water would not be compensable, because the employer does not have
the right to control such acts.
12 Note 5 supra.
1s 195 Mich. 753, 162 N.W. 335 (1917).
14 Principal case at 490.
15 O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 71 S.Ct. 470 (1951); Hebert
v. Ford Motor Co., 285 Mich. 607 at 610, 281 N.W. 374 (1938).
16 See McNicols Case, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697 (1913).
17 Id. at 499; Daniel v. Murray Corp. of America, 326 Mich. I, 39 N.W. (2d) 229 (1949).
9

10 Id.
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arose.18 In the context of lunch hour and rest period injuries most courts
recognize a distinction between injuries occurring on or- off the premises
of the employer,19 only the former being compensable as arising out of the
employment.20 The distinction is based on the fact that once an employee
leaves his employer's premises, unless at the latter's direction, 21 an injury
does not occur because of a hazard of the employment.22 The rationale is
not that the employer may control the employee on his premises, but that he
has control over the premises and the duty to keep them in a reasonably safe
condition.23 Since the injury in the principal case occurred on the steps
of the employer's premises most courts would hold the injury compensable.24
This result could be reached either on the theory that injuries on the
premises of the employer during rest periods are compensable, or on the
theory that plaintiff was returning to work just as she would in the morning or after lunch.25 A 1954 amendment to the Michigan act provides that
every employee going to or from work while on the premises of his employer

18 Thom v. Sinclair, [1917] A.C. 127; Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 26 N.E. (2d) 328
(1940); O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., note 15 supra.
19 Some extend compensable injuries beyond the premises of the employer. See, e.g.:
Barnett v. Britling Cafeteria Co., 225 Ala. 462, 143 S. 813 (1932); Kasari v. Industrial Commission, 125 Ohio St. 410, 181 N.E. 809 (1932); 82 A.L.R. 1043 (1933); 85 A.L.R. 97 (1933).
Some courts disallow compensation where the injury occurs on the premises, although
at a remote place. Hills v. Blair, 182 Mich. 20, 148 N.W. 243 (1914). Tennessee distinguishes between the employer's "property" and his "premises." Bennett v. Vanderbilt
University, (Tenn. 1955) 277 S.W. (2d) 386.
20 Haller v. Lansing, note 2 supra; Monahan v. Hoage, note 3 supra; Kubera's Case,
note 6 supra. 7 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, perm. ed., §1634 (1950); 38 CORN.
L. Q. 470 (1953); 6 A.L.R. 1151 (1920); 141 A.L.R. 862 (1942). This rule applies only
where the employee has a fixed place of employment, and does not include truck drivers,
traveling salesmen, etc.
21 Beaudry v. Watkins, 191 Mich. 445, 158 N.W. 16 (1916); Anderson v. Kroger
Grocery 8c Baking Co., 326 Mich. 429, 40 N.W. (2d) 209 (1949).
22 Jamison v. State Temporary Commission on Agriculture, 308 N.Y. 683, 124 N.E.
(2d) 321 (1954).
23 Schank v. Glenn L. Martin-Nebraska Co., 147 Neb. 385, 23 N.W. (2d) 557 (1946).
If an employee is in a place not permitted by the employer he is not in the course of his
employment. See note 3 supra.
24 Hallett's Case, 232 Mass. 49, 121 N.E. 503 (1919); Sundine's Case, note 6 supra;
Kantor v. William Armstrong Publishing Co., 236 App. Div. 749, 258 N.Y.S. 488 (1932);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 91 Ga. App. 305, 85 S.E. (2d) 484 (1954). This is true even
if the premises are used by the public, too. Manville v. Department of Labor, 294 N.Y. I,
59 N.E. (2d) 780 (1944).
25This involves application of the "coming and going" rule. Generally, an injury
to an employee going to or from work is not compensable unless the injury occurs on the
employer's premises a reasonable time before or after working time. See Western Coal
8c Mining Co. V. Industrial Commission, 296 Ill. 408, 129 N.E. 779 (1921); 7 SCHNEIDER,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, perm. ed., §1629 (1950).
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be presumed to be in the course of his employment.26 It is hoped that this
amendment will be construed to include not only persons going to or from
work, but also employees injured on their employer's premises during rest
periods.
Hazen v. Hatch, S.Ed.

26 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948; Supp. 1955) §412.1. This statute was not applied in the
principal case because the injury occurred in 1951, but on the theory of Rockledge v.
Garwood, 340 Mich. 444, 65 N.W. (2d) 785 (1954), tµe statute might have been given
retroactive effect. The amendment is remedial, and merely restores a remedy recognized
in Michigan as late as 1948 that an injury on the employer's premises was compensable
even though the conduct had but an indirect connection with the employment. Haggar
v. Tanis, 320 Mich. 295, 30 N.W. (2d) 876 (1948). See also Brink v. J. W. Wells Lumber
Co., 229 Mich. 35, 201 N.W. 222 (1924), subsequently overruled by Weaver v. General
Motors Corp., 330 Mich. 404, 47 N.W. (2d) 665 (1951).

